11![Optimal Voting Rules Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Xianwen Shi July 31, 2016 Abstract We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian) Optimal Voting Rules Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Xianwen Shi July 31, 2016 Abstract We derive the incentive compatible and ex-ante welfare maximizing (i.e., utilitarian)](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/23ad3ff16b2ac2cb361399c6bac48b14.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: pluto.huji.ac.ilLanguage: English - Date: 2016-07-31 07:25:14
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12![Revenue Maximization with a Single Sample Peerapong Dhangwatnotai∗ Department of Computer Science, Stanford University 460 Gates Building, 353 Serra Revenue Maximization with a Single Sample Peerapong Dhangwatnotai∗ Department of Computer Science, Stanford University 460 Gates Building, 353 Serra](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/a2cf34e859a0f77a819dcfa77cca30fc.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34
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13![Optimal Mechanism Design and Money Burning Jason D. Hartline∗ Tim Roughgarden† Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Optimal Mechanism Design and Money Burning Jason D. Hartline∗ Tim Roughgarden† Electrical Engineering and Computer Science](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/409cf3c65ecb20a6a438732556da0ab6.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2008-03-17 23:29:32
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14![CS364B: Exercise Set #4 Due by the beginning of class on Wednesday, February 5, 2014 Instructions: (1) Turn in your solutions to all of the following exercises directly to one of the TA (Okke). Please type your solutions CS364B: Exercise Set #4 Due by the beginning of class on Wednesday, February 5, 2014 Instructions: (1) Turn in your solutions to all of the following exercises directly to one of the TA (Okke). Please type your solutions](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/305730c12347520f43ba74887efdf88d.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2014-01-31 23:29:10
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15![Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/1897f73836e725715eef8c7dae74f6fc.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.deLanguage: English - Date: 2011-01-21 03:44:57
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16![Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/ed8fb4d13faaf7e539ed8a12a9e22370.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.comLanguage: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34
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17![Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem with Two-Dimensional Types Ruben Hoeksma1 and Marc Uetz2 1 2 Optimal Mechanism Design for a Sequencing Problem with Two-Dimensional Types Ruben Hoeksma1 and Marc Uetz2 1 2](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/216798036960437cf6888c9d233649c5.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: dii.uchile.clLanguage: English - Date: 2016-08-08 18:08:00
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18![Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/08834a28c809d8e2ac8fb8be68ee8a0b.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theory.stanford.eduLanguage: English - Date: 2009-05-12 00:18:06
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19![T HEORY OF C OMPUTING, Volume), pp. 95–119 www.theoryofcomputing.org S PECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF R AJEEV M OTWANI Revenue Submodularity T HEORY OF C OMPUTING, Volume), pp. 95–119 www.theoryofcomputing.org S PECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF R AJEEV M OTWANI Revenue Submodularity](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/ef165d4d4984acc69a439760974e0546.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: theoryofcomputing.orgLanguage: English - Date: 2014-11-14 13:01:36
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20![Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu∗ Abstract We study the revenue maximizing allocation of several heterogeneous, commonly Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu∗ Abstract We study the revenue maximizing allocation of several heterogeneous, commonly](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/77021375897ab68a9bdf1795a2d226af.jpg) | Add to Reading ListSource URL: pluto.huji.ac.ilLanguage: English - Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:04
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